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The Intersection of Civil and Religious Family 
Law in the U.S. Constitutional Order 
A Mild Legal Pluralism 
LINDA C. MCCLAIN 
T his chapter considers how civil and religious family law intersect in the U.S. legal system and how U.S. constitutional law shapes and constrains the accommodation of religious pluralism as it pertains to family law.' Is 
there too little or too much pluralism in U.S. family law? In keeping with the First 
Amendment's prohibition on governmental establishment of religion, the United 
States has neither a robust or "strong" legal pluralism, which would treat state and 
non-state (religious) entities as authorities sharing coequal jurisdiction and power, 
nor a "state-law pluralism," which would delegate family-law matters to religious 
courts! Instead, U.S. courts often use the technique Maleiha Malik describes as 
"severance; in which they "consider issues on a case-by-case basis and distinguish 
between those of the minority legal order's norms that cai:i be accommodated. 
without compromising liberal constitutional principles from those that must be 
rejected or prohib!ted."3 
Family law in the United States, I will argue, embraces a mild legal pluralism 
while clearly distinguishing between civil and religious marriage. As an entry point, 
I discuss the ongoing debate over whether civil family law should permit same-sex 
couples to marry. I then consider two categories of cases: (1) cases in which courts 
consider whether to enforce terms of religious marriage contracts, divorce agree-
ments, or arbitration agreements, and (i.) cases in which courts decide whether the 
principle of.comity requires them to recognize foreign marriages and· judgments 
of divorce. These cases highlight that U.S. family law generally accommodates 
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religious pluralism, subject to constitutibnai norms and public policy. This chapter 
then argues that the recent enactment of state bans on the application of foreign 
law (so-called anti-sharia laws) reflects a misunderstanding-if not rejection-of 
this mild legal pluralism. T4ese laws reflect an evident concern that .there is a fun-
damental clash between the U.S. Constitution and sharia, and that, without such 
bans, courts will be on a slippery slope toward establishing a theocratic code that 
would replace the U.S. Constitution.4 Concei;n,s over the equality of women in 
matters of family law feature calls for such bans. That concern is acute with respect 
to a third category of cases involving religion and the law: attempts to assert reli-
gious beliefs about family roles as a defense against public laws prohibiting domes-
tic violence and sexual assault. Such appeals to religion or culture will not trump 
the protective policies of civil and criminal law. Through all of these examples, this 
chapter argues that legal pluralism in U.S. family law is appropriately mild rather 
than robust because such pluralism is within the frame of U.S. constitutional law 
and the commitments of family law. 
WHA,T IS LEGAL PLURALISM? 
A broad understanding of legal pluralism would include the multiple sources of 
normative ordering in a society, not simply the "official" legal syst~m found in cases, 
statutes, constitutions, administrative regulations, and the like, but also "unoffi-
cial" sources oflaw, such as religious regulation of marriage and \iivorce, rules, and 
customs.5 Unofficial family law may have a formative effect on persons, families, 
and communities, eveJ.1 if it lacks the imprimatur of binding civil or state author-
ity.6 The definition of legal pluralism that I use in this chapter distinguishes this 
normative pluralism-that people recognize an.cl adhere to many sources of norms 
"other than those of the state's laws"7-from a narrower focus on that imprimatur 
of civil and state authority, given that "state law" is "fundamentally different" tha11 
non-state forms of ordering because "it exercises the coercive power of the state 
and monopolizes the sy:mbolic p9wer associated with state· authority."8 Family law 
in the United States embraces a mild form oflegal pluralism when U.S. courts "give 
official, or civil effect to certain aspects of religious family law."9 Such pluralism 
is appropriately constrained not only by "our fundaf!\ental 'political and, consti-
tutional values;" such as equality, 11ondiscrimination, due process, and religious 
freedom, but also by "'the protective policies that form the foundation for our 
particular rules of [U.S.] family law.' "10 
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SHARED CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY 
TO PERFORM MARRIAGES 
A curious feature of U.S. family law is that although the constitution prohibits the 
establishment of religion, often interpreted as requiring the separation of church 
(and for that matter, synagogue and mosque) and state, civil and religious authori-
ties cooperate with respect to entry into marriage. Although state laws do not 
require a religious ceremony to validate·a civil marriage," such laws allow religious 
officiants to solemnize a marriage that is valid as a· civil marriage, provided the for-
mal requirements such as licensing are m:et. Thus, one ceremony may have dual 
effect: a couple is married in the eyes of their religious community and of die state. 
If a couple fails to obtain a proper marriage license ot if the religious officiant is 
not authorjzed under civil law to perform the ceremony, that marriage may be valid 
for purposes of religious law but invalid civilly. Nonetheless, reflecting family law's 
strong public policy favoring marriage, state family law ofi:en provides curative doc-
trines allowing marriages wit;h procedural defects to be found valid." However, if a 
couple has a religious marriage not recognized under civil law, they lack the protec-
tions of civil family law, such as duties of economic support during marriage and 
entitlements to property distribution and spousal support at divorce.'3 
That U.S. family law permits solemnization of marriage in a religious ceremony 
to create a valid civil marriage suggests a mild form oflegal pluralism. By incorpo-
rating "unofficial law and norms into the civil rite, the state appropriates and rein-
forces the solemnity of the occasion for its own purposes;' such as impressing "the 
couples and the community with the seriousness of the marriage commitment."'4 
DISTINGUISHING CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS MARRIAGE: 
THE EXAMPLE OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
That religious officials may perform marriages with civil effects reflects U.S. family 
law's roots in early English marriage law, when marriage "was the exclusive concern 
of ecclesiastical courts and the canon law:'•s Civil family law bears the traces of 
these ecclesiastical origins, but "in America marriage has always been regulated by 
the civil law," with "many state statutes" explicitly "providing that marriage is a civil 
contract."16 The state, in effect, is a third party to every marriage contract. 
The ongoing battle over access by same-sex couples to civil marriage reveals the 
significance of the distinction between civil and religious marriage. As the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated in Goodridge v. Department of Public 
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Health, in which it ruled that the Massachusetts state constitution required that 
same-sex couples be allowed to marry: "Simply put, the government creates civil 
marriage. In Massachusetts, civil marriage is, and since pre-colonial days has 
been, precisely wh.at its name implies: a wholly secular institution."'< As the court 
explained, although people-and religious denominations-differ in their moral 
and religious views about the morality of homosexuality and the definition of ma~­
riage, that is irrelevant· to the legal and constitutional question of whether same-sex 
couples may be denied access to civil maqiage.'8 As state legislatures revise state 
laws to allow same-sex couples to marry, lawmakers similarly stress marriage as a 
civil institution, crafting laws with a two-pronged focus on promoting marriage 
equality and protecting religious freedorµ through. religious exemptions so that 
religious clergy, religious institutions, and benevolent organizations need not pro-
vide facilities or goods and services related to solemnizing or celebrating such mar-
riages in viol.!l~ion of their religious beliefs.'9 
By contrast, when Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) 
in I996, the U.S. House of Representatives report explicitly intertwined Civil and 
religious marriage in explaining DOMA's purposes: "Civil laws that permit only 
heterosexual marriage reflect and ho11or a coUective moral judgment about human 
sexuality. This judgment entails both moral disapproval of homosexuality, and a 
moral conviction that heterosexuality better comports with traditional (especially 
Judeo-Chr:ig!ai:i) worality."20 This rl;ietoric reflects the ideal of congruence between 
civil and religious law and that government should promote religious morality." 
It conflicts with the principle that moral disapproval alone is not a constitution-
ally legitimate basis for a discriminatory law.12 Thus, when the U.S. Supreme Court 
struck down section 3 ofDOMA-which defined "marriage" for purposes offed-
eral law as only the union of one man and one woman-as an unconstitutional 
"deprivation of the liberty of the person protected by the Fifth Amendment of the 
Constitution;' it cited the House report's language as evidence that DOMA's pur-
pose and effect was "interference with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages."21 
HOW U.S. FAMILY-LAW COURTS ACCOMMODATE 
RELIGIOUS FAMILY LAW WITHIN THE CONTOURS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 
Family law in the United States is already, to a degree, pluralist, but COl}Stitutional 
law and the values and public policies instantiated in family law shape the degree 
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oflegal pluralism.14 A useful organizing device is to distinguish two· categories of 
family-law cases. In the first are cases in· which civil courts are asked to uphold 
or enforce terms of a religious marriage contract, divorce agreement, or arbitra-
tion agreements about marriage or divorce. Those cases generally reflect forms of 
private ordering that allow couples to alter or opt out of default rules that would 
otherwise apply to their marriage or divorce. Contemporary family law favors such 
private ordering.15 Moreover, the desire to abide by religious norms extends beyond 
family law: .People and even businesses may agree to resolve their disputes through 
religious arbitration.16 When such private ordering occurs in the context of reli-
gious marriage and divorce, courts apply principles of contract law and make clear 
that, to avoid running afoul of the Establishment Clause, they can only itphold 
such agreements if they can apply "neutral principles:' 
The second category of cases involves the doctrine of comity; that is, whether a 
court will recognize,--,,-or refuse to recognize-a foreign marriage, divorce, or court 
order, which may also be based on religious family law. Given that individuals often 
cross national borders, marrying in one nation and· divorcing in another, or engage 
in forum shopping to obtain more favorable terms in a religious or foreign forum, 
these cases may be complex. 
A significant issue this body oflaw raises, as I elaborate elsewhere, is "how civil 
family law's concerns for procedural and.substantive fairness shape the accommo-
dation now afforded to religious law." For example, "religious family law often has 
gender asymmetries in the rights and duties of husbands and wives (including the 
power to initiate a divorce)- and of fathers and mothers," and "rules concerning 
the economic consequences of marriage and divorce" in certain religious tradi-
tions "differ from the economic partnerships model of civil family law:'17 Given the 
trend in family law toward private ordering, should a Muslim woman's agreement 
to forego economic sharing of property upon divorce because it is "un-Islamic; for 
instance, warrant closer scrutiny for voluntariness and fairness than a non-Muslim 
woman's agreement to do so because her more affiuent spouse insists upon it as a 
precondition for marriage ?'8 
RELIGIOUS MARRIAGE CONTRACTS, ARBITRATION 
AGREEMENTS, AND DIVORCE AGREEMENTS 
Courts sometimes enforce terms of marriage contracts entered into pursuant to 
Jewish or Islamic marriages. They do so mindful of First Amendment prohibitions 
on the establishment of religion, precluding courts from getting entangled with 
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religious disputes. A l<;ading case is Avitzur v. Avitzur, in which, following U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent, New York's Court of Appeals concluded it could use 
"neutral principles of contract law" -without resorting to religious doctrine-
to enforce a contractual obligation in a Jewish couple's marriage contract (the 
ketubah) that they would appear before the beth-din, a Jewish religious tribunal, 
to allow it to "advise and counsel" them concerning their marriage.29 An aim of 
such arbitration clauses is to help the wife secure from her husband a get, a formal 
document of divorce, so that she is free to remarry and not be an agunah, a woman 
chained to her marriage.30 
In Odatalla v. Odatalla,3' a New Jersey court similarly relied on the "neutral 
principles" approach to reject a husband's argument that enforcing a mahr agree" 
ment, entered into during an Islamic marriage ceremony, to pay his wife $10,000 
in postponed dowry would "violate the separation of church and state." Using 
principles of contract law, the court held that the agreement was not too vague to 
be enforced, finding persuasive the wife's testimony about when payment could 
be demanded. 
Courts have also upheld agreements by parties who are divorcing civilly to.reli-
gious arbitration of the terms of their divorce. In ]abri v. Qaddura, for example, 
a divorcing Texas couple signed an "Arbitration Agreement" to submit all claims 
and disputes to binding arbitration "by the Texas Islamic Court."31 When they dis-
agreed over the scope of the agreement, the trial court ruled the agreement was not 
valid or binding and refused to compel arbitration. The appellate court reversed, 
noting that "arbitration is strongly favored under federal and' state law," and "every 
reasonable presumption must be decided in favor of arbitration."33 
EXAMPLES OF COURTS DECLINING TO ENFORCE 
MARRIAGE CONTRACT TERMS 
Some state courts are less accommodating, concluding that the First Amendment 
bars them from enforcing terms of religious marriage contracts because they are 
"rooted in a religious practice;' and therefore the obligation is "not a legal con-
tract."34 Others conclude·that payments to a wife that are contingent upon divorce 
violate public policy and punish the husband. 
Some courts view religious marriage agreements as generally enforceable, but 
decline to enforce in particular cases because of a failure to satisfy basic rules of 
contract. Thus, in In re Marriage of Obaidi and Oayoum, a Washington appel" 
late court reversed the.trial court's enforcement of a term in the-nikah, an Islamic 
THE INTERSECTION OF CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS FAMILY LAW 385 
marriage contract, requiring the husband to pay the wife $2.o,ooo, the deferred 
portion of the mahr.35 The husband (raised in the United States and a U.S. citizen) 
and the wife (from Canada) were "children of Afghan immigrants": He signed a 
mahr agreement as part of the nik4h ceremony. Subsequently, the couple had an 
"Islamic marriage ceremony;' and then "solemnized their marriage.civilly."36 
On appeal, the appellate court cited Odatalla as a "helpful framework;' indicat-
ing there was no First Amendment problem. By contrast to Odatalla, however, it 
concluded the mahr agreement was "invalid" under Washington's rules about the.for-
mation and validity of contracts because there was "no meeting of the minds on the 
essential terms of the agreement," such as "why or when the $20,000 would be paid."37 
Also, the husband learned of the mahr fifteen minutes before he signed it and had no 
opportunity to consult with legal counsel. His uncle conducted the negotiations in 
Farsi, a language unknown to the husband,·and advised him after he signed the agree-
ment. The reviewing court noted the trial court's.conclusion that "the agreement was 
influenced by duress," due to "a lot of pressure from both families."38 On the one hand, 
this ruling is consistent with case law holding premarital and marital agreements unen-
forceable when circumstances indicate consent was not informed or voluntary (such as 
being presented with an agreement shortly before the wedding guests arrive). On the 
other hand, "in this cultural context, ... different expectations probably apply;' as the 
husband, in adopting "a wedding format customary in his (Afghani) culture;' would 
have "anticipated that the nikah included a mahr:'39 
CASES INVOLVING COMITY 
A second category of cases involve whether, applying the doctrine of comity, a 
court will recognize foreign marriage contracts or divorce judgments (wnich may 
be based on religious law). One instructive example is Aleem v. Aleem, where a 
Maryland appellate court upheld a lower court's ruling that it need not give comity 
to a Pakistani talaq divorce (where the husband pronounced three times that he 
was divorcing his wife) and was not barred from ordering that the wife receive 
equitable distribution ofher husband's pension.40 Maryland's highest court sub-
sequently affirmed, stating that talaq divorce, where "only the male, i.e., husband, 
has an independent right to utilize talaq and the wife may utilize it only with the 
husband's permission, is contrary to Maryland's constitutional provisions and ... to 
the public policy ofMaryland."4 ' 
Aleem also illustrates judicial concern about strategic forum shopping that 
defeats the protective purposes of a state's family law. When the wife initiated 
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a civil divorce, the couple had never lived together in Pakistan, but .had lived in 
Maryland more than twenty years ·and reared two children, both U.S. citizens. The 
husband countered by obtaining a talaq divorce at the Pakistani Embassy in Wash-
ington, D.C. He then argued that their.marriage contract.entered into in Pakistan 
and providing the wife a deferred dowry of $2,500 should resolve any property 
issues.4 " The court disagreed. Pakistani law's "default" rule, that a wife had no 
rights to property titled in her husband's name, directly conflicted with Maryland's 
"default" rule, that awife had a right to division of equitable distribution of mari-
tal property (including her husband's pension).41 A critical factor in the Maryland 
court's conclusion that it could "effect an equitable distribution of marital prop-
erty" was that there was a sufficient "nexus; or connection~ between the couple's 
marriage and Maryland. 44 
In her informative study, Islamic Divorce in North America, Julie Macfarlane 
found similar attempts at forum shopping, in which a husband challenged civil 
divorce proceedings initiated by a wife, arguing "that the couple was already 
divorced by talaq in an overseas country," and that comity "absolves-him from fur-
ther financial responsibilities toward his ex-spouse."41 
"SEVERANCE" OR WHOLESALE REJECTION OF 
"FOREIGN" RELIGIOUS LAW? 
Two recent cases demonstrate the contrast between what Malik calls (in this vol-
ume) a "severance," or issue-by-issue, approach to legal recognition of foreign (reli-
gious) law and a wholesale rejection of such law as incompatible with public policy, 
a stance fortified by state bans on judges applying foreign law. 
In S.B. v. W.A., 46 a wife asked a New York court to recognize and enter a divorce 
judgment entered in Abu Dhabi, in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Notable is 
the court's careful examination ofUAE law and its willingness to enforce the judg-
ment, despite conflicts between UAE and New York law in areas not germane to 
that judgment. The couple married civilly in New York, as well as "in a religious 
ceremony under Islamic law," as part of which they signed a mahr agreement,.47 
When the wife, a U.S. citizen, sought divorce, they had relocated to Abu Dhabi 
for the husband's employment. Precipitating the divorce was the prosecution and 
conviction of the husband, "under Islamic Law" and the UAE's criminal law, for 
"'violently commit[ing] outrage upon [the plaintiff/wife];" causing serious inju-
ries. In the criminal trial, the court concluded. that the facts supported the wife's 
account ofher injuries and that the husband "crossed the legal limits to discipline 
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his wife." On appeal, he unsuccessfully argued his conduct was within "a man's legal 
right upon his wife to discipline her," under the UAE penal code~48 
The wife obtained a judgment of divorce on the basis of the husband's assault 
conviction and an order that he pay her deferred dowry, under the mahr, of 
$l50,ooo.49 Notably, the parties could have requested the Abu Dhabi court apply 
New York law to their divorce proceeding, but did not. 
The ex-husband returned to the United States to avoid enforcement of the 
divorce judgment, triggering the ex-wife's suit in New York for enforcement.5° The 
New York court applied the "general principle" that "a divorce decree obtained 
in a foreign jurisdiction by residents of this State, in accordance with the laws 
thereof, is entitled to recognition under the principle of comity unless the decree 
offends· the public policy of the State of New York." The grounds on which the 
wife obtained divorce in the UAE-"harm and da.mage" -were not "repugnant" 
to New York's public policy, but were similar to "cruel and inhuman treatment" 
under New York's family law.5' The ex-husband argued that it violated New York's 
public policy that the Abu Dhabi court "entered a divorce judgment based upon 
the religious marriage and declined to recognize and litigate the civil marriage," 
but the court countered that the divorce was litigated in a "civilian state court, not 
a Sh.aria religious court:' 
Similarly unsuccessful was the husband's policy argument that "the laws of 
the UAE are based upon Sharia law." In notable contrast to the fears of "sharia 
law" shown by some courts and state legislatures (as I discuss later), the New York 
court reasoned that, while "parts of Sharia Law governing personal status would 
indeed violate our domestic policy, such as laws allowing husbands to practice 
polygyny and use of physical force to discipline their wives;' "none of the prin-
ciples used by the Abu Dhabi courts in the parties' divorce action" to "determine 
the financial issues" .between them violated.New York's· public policy.12 Recogniz-
ing the foreign judgment that the defendant pay the wife "a distributive award" of 
$~,so,ooo based on the mahr agreement, the court invoked Avitzur to conclude 
that the agreement, entered into after the civil marriage ceremony (in New York), 
was a "post marital" or "aritenuptial" contract obligation, enforceable "according 
to neutral principles oflaw" provided it did not violate state law or public policy.11 
Fundamental principles of comity, the court concluded, supported enforcing the 
judgment: It was "rendered under a system of justice compatible with due pro-
cess of law," and there was no evidence it was "procured through fraud" or that 
enforcing it "would be repugnant to the public policy of this state or of noti<?ns 
of fairness."14 
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By contrast to the fine-grained approach of the New York court in S.B. v. W.A., 
the court in a recent Kansas case, Soleimani v. Soleimani," viewed a mahr agree-
ment entered into during an Iranian marriage ceremony between a U.S. citizen 
(the groom) and an Iranian citizen (the bride) as inextricably tainted by Islam's evi-
dently unequal treatment of women in marriage and divorce . .Enforcing it would, 
thus, entail "fashioning a remedy under a contract that clearly emanates from a 
legal code that may be antithetical to Kansas law." The court found several prob-
lems with the mahr agreement as a matter ofKansas's contract law, but made clear 
that its more fundamental objection was that such agreements "stem from jurisdic-
tions that do not separate church and state and may, in fact, embed discrimination 
through religious doctrine."56 In support, the court invoked Kansas's newly enacted 
ban on judicial enforcement of"foreign" law. Finally, the court accepted the hus-
band's argument that enforcing the mahr would violate public policy by displacing 
Kansas's family law with respect to economic distribution of property at divorce. 
Solemaini reflects an unwarranted fear of "too much pluralism" in family law. 
In dramatic terms, the court perceived a clash in values between two legal regimes: 
"the protection of Kansas law ... requires an equitable division of property in a 
secular system that is not controlled by the dictates or religious authorities or even 
a society dominated by men who place values on women in medieval .terms."17 A 
striking aspect of the opinion is that the court shows some basic understanding of 
Islamic family law, but the gender asymmetries of that law function as reasons not 
to enforce the mahr agreement. The court observed that because Islamic law, like 
"traditional Jewish law," allows men "to unilaterally .declare a divorce," the mahr 
is "a means of tempering the inequities of traditional religious law" and may be 
"culturally justified."18 However, the fact that "wives have no right to pronounce 
the talaq" violates the Equal Protection Clause requirement that the law not treat 
persons differently based on "arbitrary or invidious" distinctions. The case before 
it, however, did not involve a talaq divorce; nonetheless, it noted that Michigan 
state courts declined to give comity to foreign talaq divorces because those legal 
systems deny equal protection under Michigan's laws.59 
The Kansas court expressed concern over abdicating its "overall constitutional 
role to protect ... fundamental rights," citing the Kansas legislature's then-new law 
barring judicial use of foreign law, which provided: 
A contract or contractual provision, if capable of segregation, which provides 
for the choice of foreign law, legal code, or system to govern some or all of the 
disputes between the parties adjudicated by a court of law or by an arbitration 
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panel arising from the contract mutually agreed upon shall violate the public 
policy of this state and be void and unenforceable if the foreign law, legal code, 
or system chose~ includes or incorporates any substantive or procedural law, as 
applied to the dispute at issue, that would not grant th_e parties the same funda-
mental liberties, rights, and privileges granted under the United States and Kansas 
constitutions, including, but not limited to, equal protection, due process, free exer-
cise of religion, freedom of speech or press, and any right of privacy or marriage.6° 
The court cited Kansas's ban to fortify its concern about upholding religious law 
that arbitrarily discrimjnates against wives,6' but refused to enforce a wife's right.to 
the deferred portion of the mahr ($677,0000 at divorce) because it would impose 
an exorbitant economic penalty on her husband. The court accepted.the husband's 
argument that the mahr offended public policy because "it would interfere with 
the Court's ability to make a just and equitable division [of property] under Kansas 
law," without regard to fault.61 The court also cited to California cases ruling that 
terms in Jewish and Islamic religious marriage contracts that provided the wife a 
substantial payment of money or half of the husband's property in the event of 
divorce offended public policy because they encouraged divorce.6' 
Once again, the Kansas court shows some understanding oflslamic family law, 
citing scholarly sources, but refuses to engage in a careful, contextual evaluation of 
whether enforcing the mahr would violate public policy. Thus, it observes that, "In 
Islamic tradition, each spouse retains their own.assets as separate property during 
the marriage, and so marital or community property is foreign to Islam." Mahr 
negotiations, thus, by contrast to premarital agreements, "do not> represent an 
attempt to bargain around default divorce laws." It then casts doubt on whether the 
"neutral principles oflaw" approach is realistic, given the "'Islamic shadow behind 
which husband and wife'" negotiate the mahr; frequently, they did so in home 
countries without U.S. family law's default rules and did not "anticipate litigation 
in American courts and confronting state equitable division or community prop-
erty laws."6• However accurate this description may be.of the reasonable expecta-
tions of Muslims unfamiliar with U.S. law, it hardly describes Mr. Soleimani. He lefi: 
Iran for the United States in I977, became a· naturalized U.S. citizen, and was quite 
familiar with Kansas's law of equitable distribution as, when he "divorced his first 
wife of 30 years in a Kansas civil proceeding, they both received.marital property! 
Moreover, subsequent to the Iranian marriage ceremony, he married his second 
wife civilly and reside_d with her in Kansas.61 As Macfarlane observes: "In practice, 
many modern Muslim couples [in North America] have an expectation of sharing 
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assets and resources both during their marriage and if they come to resolve the 
financial consequences of divorce," whether such agreement is "formally incorpo-
rated in. their nikah, or more commonly simply an understanding between them."66 
Seen in this context, then, the Aleem case, on which the Kansas court relies, was 
an unsuccessful end-run around such economic sharing: The husband, a long-time 
U.S. resident, contended the mahr payment of $2,500 should exhaust his wife's eco-
nomic rights at divorce, while under Maryland law of equitable distribution, the 
wife was entitled to at least half of the $2 million in marital property.67 
One can conclude both that Aleem was correct and that Soleimani was incor-
rect. Rather than viewing the mahr agreement either as negotiated in ignorance of 
Kansas law or as an attempt. to displace Kansas's family law, the court might better 
have considered it as one factor in determining what distribution of marital prop-
erty would be equitable in the parties' short marriage. If paid, it would also be an 
asset in the ex-wife's column that would likely elirp.inate her need for any spousal 
support and would be a debt in the husband's column that could affect his ability 
to pay any support.68 
"ANTI-SHARIA LAWS" OR BANS ON "FOREIGN LAW": 
A REJECTION OF FAMILY-LAW PLURALISM 
The Kansas law to which the Soleimani court referred is emblematic of a wave oflaws 
proposed or enacted in state legislatures "to ban the use of foreign or international 
law in legal disputes;' spurred by "fears that Islamic laws and customs-commonly 
referred to as 'Sharia' .,......,are taking over American courts."69 These bills generally use 
as a template model legislation drafted by a small group of"anti-Muslim activists" 
who warn that Islamic extremists seek to supplant U.S. constitutional and state 
law-=-:particularly, family law-with sharia, with dire consequences, particularly 
for women.70 These laws "grossly mischaracterize-both the meaning and practice of 
Sharia," including the "diversity of interpretation oflslam."71 In effect, they reject 
the legal pluralism present in U.S. family law while failing to understand that the 
U.S. Constitution and family law already limit the application by judges in the U.S. 
legal system of religious and foreign law. 
The first generation of such laws specifically targeted "sharia law." Thus, Okla-
homa State Representative Rex Duncan characterized his proposed constitutional 
amendment (the Save Our State amendment) as a "war for the survival of our 
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country" and over "what religion should undergird civil law."7" The amendment, he 
argued, was a "simple effort to ensure that our courts are not used to undermine" 
America's founding "Judea-Christian principles."73 Contemporaneous reports con-
tended that sharia rejected many basic American values, including equal treatment 
urider tpe law (of men and women, and Muslims and non-Muslims) and warned of 
the establishment of a "globaHslamic state" with objectives "incompatible with the 
U.S. Constitution" and "the civil rignts" it guarantees.74 
On November 2, 2010, 70 percent ofOklahorria citizens approved the Save Our 
State amendment, which provided: "The courts shall not look to the legal precepts 
of other nations and cultures. Specifically, the courts shall not consider interna-
tional law or Sharia Law."71 After a challenge brought by Mr. Muneer Awad, an 
American citizen residing in Oklahoma and executive director of the Oklahoma 
chapter of the Council of American-islamic Relations (CAIR), a federal court 
enjoined the amendment.76 Mr. Awad argued that he had suffered multiple inju-
ries. The amendment officially condemned and disfavored his religion, in violation 
of the Establishment Clause, and made it impossible for his last will and testa-
ment, which was based in sharia, to be executed by the court.77 The Tenth Circuit 
affirmed, noting that the amendment singled our "only one form of religious law-
Sharia law," and "discriminates among religions," triggering review under the strict 
scrutiny test.7a Oklahoma failed this test. The Tenth Circuit concluded that Okla-
homa's interest in "determining what law is applied in Oklahoma courts;' while 
"valid," was not "compelling" because the defendants did not "identify any actual 
problem the challenged amendment seeks to solve" and "did not know of even a 
single instance where an Oklahoma court had applied Sharia law or used the legal 
precepts of other nations or cultures."79 The court observed that the ban went far 
beyond "preventing courts from 'applying' Sharia law" to forbidding them from 
"'considering' those laws."ao 
In light of the fate of Oklahoma's law, the next generation of foreign-law bans 
(such as in Kansas) omitted specific reference to a specific culture or religion.a' 
·Indeed, many bans "are so broadly phrased as to cast doubt on a whole host of 
personal and business arrangements," which is a reason that many groups, includ-
ing faith communities, have "mobilized against them."82 Commentators correctly 
observe that these laws are usually unnecessary "smoke and mirrors:" When courts 
are asked to enforce agreements that use Jewish and Muslim laws-as they rou-
tinely are-if there is a conflict between U.S. constitutional and family law and 
religious law, U.S. law prevails.a3 
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"MY RELIGION MADE ME DO IT" 
One spur for bans on sharia was a New Jersey court judge's highly publicized 
failure, in S.D. v. M.JR., to find that a husband had raped his wife because of 
his asserted religious belief that his conduct was permitted. This case illustrates 
a third category of case in which courts confront religious family law: the asser-
tion of a religious defense to important public laws against domestic violence 
and sexual assault. The New Jersey judge ruled against a Muslim woman, who 
sought a permanent restraining order against her spouse after he raped and 
abused her repeatedly, because-as CNN 'reported it-"her husband was abid-
ing by his Muslim beliefs regarding spousal duties."84 The judge was reversed 
and rebuked on appeal, but his ruling "sparked a nationwide firestorm;' as pro-
ponents of anti-sharia laws cited it as evidc:;nce of "creeping" sharia encroaching 
on the rule oflaw.8s 
S.D. v. MJR. offers a disturbing example of the "my culture [or religion] 
made me do it" defense: when people appeal to "culture" or "religion" to justify 
sexist, violent practices, and, what's worse, judges or legislators sometimes cre-
dence these claims.86 Both the wife/plaintiff, S.D., and the defendant/husband, 
M.J.R., were Moroccan citizens and.Muslims, living in New Jersey. They married 
in Morocco in an arranged marriage when she was 17 and "did not know each 
other prior to the marriage."87 The wife asserted repeated abusive treatment by 
her husband-including rape-during a very short marriage. She alleged that 
he rationalized his conduct, telling her: "this is according to our religion. You 
are my wife, I c[an] do anything to you. The woman, she should submit and do 
anything I ask her to do."88 
Eventually, the husband verbally divorced his wife, who obtained a temporary 
restraining order against him. The trial court found that she proved by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the defendant engaged in ~harassment" (based on 
"clear proof" of nonconsensual sex) and "assault;' but ruled· that even though the 
defendant "had engaged in sexual relations with plaintiff against her expressed. 
wishes" on at least two occasions, he lacked a "criminal desire to or intent to sexu-
ally assault" because he believed his conduct was not prohibited by his religion. 
The trial court, for example, cited the imam's testimony that under Islamic law, "a 
wife must comply with her husband's sexual demands:' However, while the imam 
"did not definitely answer whether, under Islamic. law, a husband must stop his 
advances if his wife said 'no;" he "acknowledged that New Jersey law considered 
coerced sex between married people to be rape."89 
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On appeal, the reviewing court reversed and sharply reprimanded the trial 
court. This appellate opinion better reflects how U.S. courts should-and usually 
do-resolve situations in whieh, as the trial court perceived it, "religious custom 
clashed with the law;' particularly laws with a protective function.90 In a conflict 
between criminal law and religious precepts, the appellate court made clear, the 
state's crimii;ial statutes IJ\USt prevail. In support, it cited Reynolds v. United States, 
where the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a criminal conviction for bigamy despite.a 
Mormon's asserted religious belief that it was a duty to practice polygamy.9' The 
court also cited Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon 
v. Smith,92 in which the Supreme Court ruled that valid, neutral laws of general 
application may be applied to religious exercise, even without a compelling state 
interest. Thus, because New Jersey's sexual assault laws were "neutral laws of general 
application" and the defendant knowingly engaged in conduct.violating them, the 
trial court erred in refusing to recognize those violations as a basis for a determina-
tion "that defendant had committed acts of domestic violence." Legislative find-
ings asserting the seriousness of domestic violence and the responsibility of courts 
to protect domestic violence survivors offered "an additional basis" for rejecting 
the lower court's view.93 
The appellate court also ruled that the trial court erred in not issuing the wife 
a final re~training order against the husband, on the rationale that the parties had 
undergone a "bad patch" in their marriage, but her injuries were "not severe" and, 
, after divorce, a restraining order was "not necessary to prevent another act of 
domestic violence." However, because the plaintiff was pregnant, the judge con-
ceded the parties would need to be in some contact.94 The appellate court stated 
that under New Jersey's domestic violence statute, courts have an obligation to 
"protect victims of violence that occurs in a family." It expressed concern that 
the trial judge's "view of the facts ... may have been colored by his perception 
that, although defendant's sexual acts violated applicable criminal statues, they 
were culturally acceptable and thus not actionable-a view we have soundly 
rejected."95 
The "strong reprimand" delivered by the New Jersey appellate court and its mes-
sage that public policy trumps the appeal to (foreign) religious belief should "prove 
that the American justice system works" and that foreign-law bans are unneces-
sary.96 As one attorney commented on the case: "foreign law or religious law in 
America is considered within American constitutional strictures." He added that 
while a minority of Mqslims mistakenly hold a co11trary belie£ "the appellate rul-
ing is consistent with Islamic law, which prohibits spousal abuse." 97 
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CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have argued that family law in the United States includes a mild 
form of legal pluralism, which accommodates religion by allowing people room to 
order their family lives in keeping with their religious beliefs. In an era when fami-
lies increasingly cross national borders, family court judges give legal recognition 
to foreign marriage contracts and divorce judgments when principles of comity 
support doing so. This legal pluralism is mild rather than robust because it is 
appropriately constrained by the requirements of US. constitutional law and fam-
ily law. Through illustrative cases, I highlighted how courts capably work within 
this framework, while noting that some courts reject such pluralism, particularly in 
light of the recent spate of"anti-Sharia laws" or fo,reign-law bans being considered 
or enacted across the United States. These bans, I have argued, reflect a misguided 
fear of a takeover of US. courts by religious law in conflict with basic values such as 
the equality of women in the realm of marriage and divorce. Seen most charitably, 
such laws emphatically.instruct courts to "follow the constitution" and make sure it 
trumps in such a conflict.98 I have argued, however, that courts already understand 
that directive as they shape the mild legal pluralism of U.S. family law: 
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